Before addressing the history and ideas behind the Third Rome doctrine, it’s important to clarify the purpose here. This is not an attempt to disprove or prove the validity of the concept. Instead, the focus is on understanding its evolution, how it has shaped Russia’s identity, and its ongoing significance in politics, culture, and global affairs.
If you’ve come across the viral TikTok trend where women ask their boyfriends, husbands and brothers how often they think about the Roman Empire, the surprising answers—weekly, daily, or even more—highlight how Rome continues to fascinate people, especially men. Meanwhile, Russia has been obsessed with this thought for 500 years.
Russia envisioned itself as the natural successor to the Roman heritage. When Constantinople (the "Second Rome") fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453, Russian thinkers began to see Moscow as the rightful heir. By the early 1500s, it had become a defining vision. The monk Philotheus expressed it most clearly: “Two Romes have fallen, the third stands, and there will not be a fourth.” This concept, articulated centuries ago, still carries weight in how Russia views its place in the world.
To understand the idea of the Third Rome, it’s crucial to first consider the history of the First and Second Romes. According to Philotheus, the First Rome was the actual Rome—the capital of the Roman Empire. It was a city that unified dozens of societies under its rule and transformed a pagan empire into a Christian stronghold by the 4th century AD. When Christianity became the dominant religion, Rome became the center of the Christian world.
However, this legacy didn’t last. In the eyes of Orthodox Christians, the First Rome fell into heresy and lost its divine mandate after the Great Schism of 1054, which divided the Christian Church into Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. For Orthodox believers, this marked the decline of the First Rome as the true Christian capital.
Its mantle was passed to Constantinople, the main city of the Byzantine Empire, which they called the Second Rome. Constantinople became the new center of Orthodox Christianity, preserving the faith and maintaining its spiritual and political authority. This status endured until 1453, when the Ottomans conquered the city, leaving a power vacuum that Moscow sought to fill. For Orthodox believers like Philotheus, Constantinople had been the rightful heir to the First Rome, but now it was Moscow’s turn to carry the torch as the Third Rome.
The concept of “Rome” carried far more than historical or geographical meaning. It symbolized universal authority, divine purpose, and the responsibility to lead and preserve civilization. When Emperor Constantine moved the Roman capital to Constantinople in 330 AD, establishing the "New Rome," he handed down not just political authority but also a sacred duty to protect and spread the Christian faith.
Russia embraced this vision when it began to see itself as the Third Rome. It meant adopting a moral and spiritual mission to lead the Christian world. The connection became particularly pronounced through the title of Russia’s rulers: tsar, derived from the Latin Caesar. By adopting this title, Russian rulers signaled their belief that they were inheriting both the imperial authority of Rome and the spiritual responsibility of Byzantium.
In 1523, Philotheus of Pskov declared Moscow to be the final center of Christian civilization. Philotheus viewed this role as a divine appointment rather than a political opportunity. Moscow was tasked with preserving Orthodox Christianity in its purest form. He warned Russia’s rulers to govern with humility and faith, urging them to look to God rather than material wealth or power for their strength. For Philotheus, Moscow’s position was a heavy responsibility he believed would last until the end of time.
Moscow tried to establish real ties to the Byzantine Empire. Ivan III’s marriage to Sophia Palaeologus, the niece of the last Byzantine emperor, brought Byzantine traditions and symbols into the Russian court. The double-headed eagle, a symbol of imperial power, became a lasting emblem of Russia’s rulers. This connection gave Moscow a direct link to Byzantium’s heritage.
While the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome strengthened Russia’s identity, it also carried significant risks, especially in relation to the Ottoman Empire. After the fall of Constantinople, the Ottomans positioned themselves as the heirs to the Byzantine Empire. Moscow’s claim to be the new center of Orthodox Christianity directly challenged Ottoman authority.
Even if Russia didn’t take immediate action to claim former Byzantine territories, its symbolic assertion of leadership was provocative. Russian rulers, understanding the risks of openly promoting the doctrine, used it carefully. It was rarely included in official state documents and was instead treated as an internal narrative to unify the nation and strengthen its sense of purpose.
Philotheus' doctrine played a minor role in the political sphere for a long time - neither Peter I nor Catherine II used the thesis of Moscow as the Third Rome to justify their imperial policies. It was not until the 19th century that the term spread through new editions of old ecclesiastical writings and was radically reinterpreted by the historian Vladimir Ikonnikov in the late 1860s. According to Ikonnikov, the doctrine of the Third Rome established a specifically Russian messianism, derived from the imperial tradition of the Muscovite rulers. The term found its way into the vocabulary of the Pan-Slavic movement, which regarded Russia as the protective power of the Slavic peoples of Europe and sought to strengthen its position on the European continent. The focus was no longer on the protection of the Christian church through specific measures, but on the historiographical support of a Russian mission, a special path between East and West. Although the term was not officially used in politics, its use at the coronation ceremony of a tsar shows that people were certainly in agreement with its meaning.
Furthermore, the Third Rome idea deeply influenced Russian literature. In the 19th century, themes of Russia’s spiritual mission and unique destiny appeared in the works of major writers. Alexander Pushkin’s poem To the Slanderers of Russia celebrated Russia’s role as a moral authority, while Fyodor Dostoevsky explored the nation’s spiritual leadership in works like The Brothers Karamazov.
While the Bolshevik Revolution officially rejected religion, the messianic thinking associated with the Third Rome did not vanish. It simply transformed. Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev argued in the 1920s that this messianic impulse remained deeply ingrained in Russian culture, even under the atheistic Soviet regime. Berdyaev had firsthand experience of the Bolshevik era. Expelled from the Soviet Union in 1922, he developed a unique interpretation of Russian messianism that traced its continuity from religious to secular forms.
Berdyaev believed the Bolshevik vision of Russia leading a global communist revolution was essentially a secularized version of older religious messianic ideas. The belief in Russia’s special destiny and world-historical mission persisted, even as its spiritual framework was replaced by Marxist ideology. According to Berdyaev, Bolshevism drew its energy from the same cultural patterns that had inspired the Third Rome doctrine, reframing them in the language of class struggle and international revolution.
What makes Berdyaev’s analysis especially compelling is his recognition of how deeply this messianic mindset was woven into Russian identity. He argued that even an explicitly atheistic movement like Bolshevism could not escape the cultural patterns that had long defined Russia’s sense of purpose. Instead of protecting Orthodox Christianity, the Soviet Union saw itself as the leader of a worldwide struggle for socialism. For Berdyaev, this continuity highlighted how persistent and adaptable the idea of Russian messianism truly was.
In modern times, the Third Rome doctrine continues to influence Russia, particularly under Vladimir Putin. While Putin has never explicitly mentioned the doctrine, his rhetoric and policies strongly align with its principles. His emphasis on Orthodox Christianity, traditional values, and Russia’s historical mission reflects many of the ideas associated with the Third Rome.
Since 2000, Putin has used these themes to shape Russian identity. Early in his presidency, he framed Orthodoxy as a moral foundation for the nation. In 2013, he even described the Communist “Moral Code” as a simplified version of the Bible, suggesting continuity between Soviet ideals and Christian values. His 2014 statement about Crimea, likening its significance to the Temple Mount for Judaism and Islam, shows how deeply this perspective influences his worldview.
Alexander Dugin has become one of the most vocal proponents of the Third Rome idea. The anti-liberal philosopher sees Russia as a unique civilization tasked with preserving traditional values against what he views as the moral decline of the West. On 11 November 2014, a conference on the topic of Moscow - Third Rome took place in the Moscow Manege. Dugin used the platform to promote a Russian Orthodox form of government explicitly beyond liberal democracy on the basis of the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome.
The idea is also used by the conservative clergy, albeit less politically: Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin explained that it ‘reflects the world view of many Orthodox Russians’ - even if they have no precise idea of its content.
The idea of the Third Rome is a complex matter. To the Western observer, it looks utterly strange, even absurd, and from a political point of view, it can quickly be used to legitimise a Russian special path, but in terms of cultural history, it is a fascinating amalgam of religious and philosophical components that still has an impact on the Russian national mentality today.