Carl Schmitt and The Concept of the Political explained

This young man is Carl Schmitt. His firm look and steady gaze behind those glasses already show the strong thinker he would become. The photo from his early university days captures someone who looks sure of himself and smart - just like the bold ideas about politics and law he would later write about. For me, he is one of the most interesting characters of the 20th century.

He is one of those thinkers whom you cannot cancel because he was that important and good at his profession. He was a German jurist and political thinker whose work dealt with the raw mechanics of power, sovereignty, and conflict. His arguments cut to the heart of politics and challenge the ideals of liberal democracy and advocates for a strong, decisive state. Yet, for many, Schmitt’s legacy is darkened by his early support for the Nazi regime.

Early Years and Intellectual Development

Born in 1888 in Plettenberg, Germany, Carl Schmitt grew up in a conservative Catholic milieu. He studied law and quickly gained a reputation as a brilliant yet controversial mind. The early decades of the 20th century were of course a time of upheaval: the collapse of the German Empire, the rise and fall of the Weimar Republic, and, ultimately, the ascent of National Socialism. These epochal changes left a deep imprint on Schmitt’s thinking. Rather than embracing liberal democratic ideals, he became one of their biggest critics.

Schmitt’s first explicitly political text appeared in 1924 under the title Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus (often translated as The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy). Here, he sharply criticized the parliamentary system as outdated and ill-equipped to handle the social and economic pressures of modern mass democracy. He insisted that parliamentary debate, driven by competing interests, tended toward stalemate rather than decisive governance. Sounds kinda familiar...

Verfassungslehre (1928) and the Rise of a New Discipline

In 1928, Schmitt published what is often regarded as his most significant scholarly achievement: Verfassungslehre (literally, “Constitutional Theory”). This work was groundbreaking in that it laid the foundation for constitutional theory (Verfassungslehre) as an independent discipline alongside classical theories of the state. Schmitt used the Weimar Constitution as a case study, subjecting it to rigorous legal and political scrutiny. He explored the tension between liberalism’s emphasis on individual freedom and the necessity of a robust state authority, arguments that would become hallmarks of his broader political philosophy.

Move to Berlin and Contacts in Government Circles

The year Verfassungslehre appeared, Schmitt moved to the Berlin School of Commerce (Handelshochschule). Although this was considered an academic downgrade, it placed him at the heart of Germany’s political scene. In Berlin, Schmitt cultivated extensive contacts—some reaching directly into government circles—and engaged with notable intellectuals, including Alexander Rüstow, an early figure in ordoliberal and neoliberal thought.

During this period, Schmitt advocated for a “strong state” grounded in a “free economy,” a viewpoint he expressed in a notable 1932 speech titled Starker Staat und gesunde Wirtschaft (“Strong State and Healthy Economy”). Only a state with firm authority, he argued, could effectively “depoliticize” certain spheres (such as infrastructure or broadcasting) while ensuring that the market functioned freely. This stance brought Schmitt into dialogue with emerging neoliberal thinkers, illustrating that his calls for decisive governance did not necessarily translate into full-blown totalitarianism—at least not yet.

Core Concepts of Schmitt’s Political Theory

In his 1922 work, Politische Theologie (Political Theology), Schmitt famously declared, “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” By this, he meant that the true essence of state power lies in the ability to suspend the normal legal order during a crisis. The so-called “state of exception” lays bare where ultimate authority resides, for it is the sovereign who determines when and how rules no longer apply.

This conception challenges liberal constitutionalism, which seeks to bind government power through the rule of law. Schmitt’s critics accuse him of opening the door to authoritarian or dictatorial governance; his defenders counter that he merely highlights the inherent limits of legal frameworks in moments of severe emergency. Contemporary issues—ranging from antiterror legislation to pandemic responses—show how states still wrestle with finding the right balance between constitutional guarantees and extraordinary measures.

In Der Begriff des Politischen (The Concept of the Political), first published as an essay in 1927 and expanded in 1932, Schmitt defined the political in terms of the friend-enemy distinction. He argued that politics, unlike morality or economics, is inherently about existential conflict. The “enemy,” in Schmitt’s terms, is not a personal foe but a collective adversary threatening one’s way of life.

Perhaps Schmitt’s most controversial stance is his scathing critique of liberalism. Schmitt had no patience for liberalism. He saw it as a weak, indecisive ideology that prioritized individual rights and procedural fairness over decisive action. He believed that the liberal quest for endless negotiation—a “discussion without decision”—paralyzes governance. According to Schmitt, liberalism’s core principle is to keep all options open, in the vain hope of postponing or even evading fundamental conflicts. I once heard the term "eternal dialogue," which seems fitting here. I think it reflects the essence of liberalism and parliamentarism quite well. He believed that politics required strong leadership and a clear sense of purpose—something he thought liberalism sorely lacked.

In Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, Schmitt contended that parliament had become a mere façade. Instead of genuinely deliberating the common good, it hosted a series of compromises that sapped the state’s authority. Over time, he became increasingly hostile toward what he saw as “pluralism”—the proliferation of interest groups vying for influence—which, in his view, tore the state apart from within.

3. The “Untouchable Essence” of the Constitution

A vital aspect of Schmitt’s thought during the Weimar period was his idea of an “untouchable core” of the constitution (“unantastbarer Wesenskern”). He believed a constitution should enshrine fundamental decisions about the state’s nature—decisions not up for revision by mere parliamentary majorities. In his Verfassungslehre, Schmitt introduced this notion to demonstrate how certain constitutional principles, such as the unity of the state or the executive’s protective role, must be safeguarded against political opportunism.

Schmitt sparred with prominent legal scholars like Hans Kelsen over who should serve as the “guardian” of the constitution. Was it the constitutional court or the executive power—specifically, the Reichspräsident? While Kelsen favored a judicial safeguard, Schmitt argued for the Reich President as the ultimate protector of the state’s unity. This debate remains one of the most famous in German constitutional law.

Ties to Conservative and Reactionary Circles

During the late Weimar period, Schmitt’s antagonism toward pluralism and parliamentarism drew him closer to reactionary forces. He cultivated relationships within Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher’s government and engaged in behind-the-scenes constitutional strategizing. Schmitt advocated a strong presidential system that could override a gridlocked parliament—an idea that appealed to conservatives seeking to forestall both Communist revolution and the rise of National Socialism.

Despite his earlier skepticism of Adolf Hitler, Schmitt joined the Nazi Party in 1933. He served as a legal advisor, lending intellectual credibility to the regime’s authoritarian measures. His writings gave philosophical cover to the suspension of constitutional rights, effectively endorsing the idea that political unity trumped legal niceties. After World War II, Schmitt was briefly imprisoned but never formally tried. He spent the rest of his life in a kind of intellectual exile, read by many but rarely embraced without reservations.

There is an ongoing debate about how much Schmitt’s theoretical frameworks inherently justify totalitarianism. On one hand, his emphasis on decision, sovereignty, and the state of exception can enable authoritarian rule. On the other hand, some argue that Schmitt’s critiques of liberalism do not necessarily undermine the rule of law. They contend that he offers sobering insights into how politics actually functions—especially in times of crisis—and that these can be reconciled with constitutional democracy if carefully handled.

Despite the moral and historical complexities surrounding Carl Schmitt, his importance to modern legal and political thought is so foundational that simply “canceling” him proves impossible. Schmitt’s intellectual contributions are studied across the ideological spectrum, because his penetrating analyses of sovereignty, constitutional theory, and the nature of political conflict cannot be ignored. Indeed, his work remains required reading in law schools and political theory seminars worldwide.

Header image source: Carl Schmitt as a student in 1912. From Paul Noack, Carl Schmitt, 1993, via Wikimedia Commons